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V  PRINCIPLE  AREAS  FOR  CORRECTIVE  ACTION I.  INTRODUCTION  AND  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND 
During  the  past  two  decades  the  Community  has  taken  a  number  of  steps 
to  ensure  equal  pay  and  equal  treatment  for  men  and  women. 
Three  Directives  have  been  issued  by  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities,  covering equal  pay  (75/117/EEC)  (1),  equal  treatment  in 
access  to  employment,  vocational  training  and  promotion,  and  working 
conditions  (76/207/EEC)  (2)  and  the  progressive  implementation  of  the 
principle of  equal  treatment  for  men  and  women  in matters  of  social 
security  <79/7/EEC)  (3). 
As  a  result  of  their evaluation  of  these  achievements,  the  European 
Parliament  issued  a  Resolution  on  11  February  1981  (4),  making  demands 
on  the  Community  institutions to  intensify and  broaden  Community 
activity in  this  area,  and,  on  the  question  at  issue,  called on  the 
Commission  to  present  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  equal  treatment 
for  men  and  women  in  tax  legislation. 
This  Resolution prompted  the  Commission  to  draw  up  its New  Community 
Action  Programme  on  the  promotion  of  equal  opportunities  for  women  to 
cover  the  years  1982-1985  (5),  listing a  series  of  specific  actions  to 
be  undertaken  at  Community  and  national  level  in order to assist  in 
the  achievement  of  equal  treatment  primarily by  making  progress  towards 
individual  rights. 
The  Action  Programme  ~1as  subsequently the  subject  of  the  Council  Resolution 
of  12  July 1982  on  the  promotion  of  equal  opportunities  for  women  (6), 
in  which  the  Council  expressed  the  will  to  implement  appropriate measures 
to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  Action  Programme. 
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(1)  OJ  No  L 45,  19.2.1975,  p.  19 
(2)  OJ  No  L 39,  14.2.1976,  p.  40 
(3)  OJ  No  L 6,  10.1.1979,  p.  24 
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(5)  COM(81)  758  final 
{6)  OJ  No  186  of  21.7.1982,  p.  3 - 2  -
Action  6  of  the  New  Community  Action  Programme  was  drawn  up  to  focus 
the  Community's  attention on  correcting  the  effects  of  fiscal  Legislation 
on  equal  treatment  in  working  life, particularly  in  so  far  as  existing 
systems  in  Member  States  might  be  the  cause  of  indirect  discrimination 
against  women.  The  stated  aim  of  Action  6  is to  implement  the  principle 
of  equal  treatment  by  revising  income  tax  systems  which  appear  to have 
an  indirect  adverse  effect  on  women's  employment,  their  right  to  work 
and  their promotion  in  employment. 
The  Commission's  task  was  to  undertake  a  comparative  analysis  of  taxation 
systems  and,  if it emerged  that  these  systems  had  any  directly or 
indirectly negative  effect  on  equal  opportunities  for  women,  to  take 
such  appropriate  measures  as  were  within  its  competence  in  this area. 
The  work  was  begun  by  the  commissioning  of  a  study  into  the  "Implementation 
of  equal  treatment  by  revising  income  tax  systems  which  appear  to  have 
an  indirect  adverse  effect  on  women's  employment,  their  right  to  work 
and  their  promotion  in  employment",  which  analysed  taxation  on  earned 
income  throughout  the  Community  (1). 
Work  has  also  been  undertaken  in  this  area  by  the  European  Parliament's 
Committee  of  Enquiry  into  the  situation of  women  in  Europe.  Its  report 
"Taxation  :  special  problems  encountered  by  women"  reached  substantially 
the  same  conclusions  as  the  analysis  conducted  by  the  Commission  and  stated 
its opinion  that  taxation  systems  should  be  neutral  as  regards  their effect 
on  women's  work. 
This  report  was  one  of  the  18  reports  from  the  Committee  of  Enquiry 
presented  to the  European  Parliament  together  with  a  Resolution  on  the  Situa-
tion of  Women  in  the  European  Community,  which  was  adopted  on  17.1.1984  (2). 
The  1984  Resolution  calls  upon  the  Commission  to  take  note  of  the 
Committee  of  Enquiry's  Report  on  Taxation  and  its conclusions  and  to 
prepare  a  "Directive on  equal  treatment  for  men  and  women  in  fiscal 
Legislation". 
(1)  V/2798/1/82  final 
(2)  Doc.  1-1229/83/C 
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II.  PRESENT  SITUATION 
The  proportion of  women  working  in  the  European  Community  has  been 
increasing - from  33.5%  in  1970  • 
to  ·37.5%  in  1982,  and  this  in  a  period  where  men's  activity rates 
have  remained  static.  This  increase  would  seem  largely due  to  the 
increased participation of  married  women  and  mothers,  and  the  rise  in 
single parent  families,  which  coupled  with  an  economic  crisis has  meant 
that  more  and  more  women  not  only  want  but  need  employment. 
These  changes  in  employment  patterns  also  demonstrate  the  need  for 
change  in  other  areas  that  affect  employment  in  order  to  take  account 
of  a  changing situation.  Income  tax  systems  that  were  set  up  with 
the  intention  of  benefiting the  traditional  family(i.e.  husband  working, 
wife  at  home  or  earning  pin-money,  and  with  dependant  childre~,  entail  in 
present  circumstances  a  very  heavy  marginal  taxation  of  the  family's  second 
income  earner,  and  will,  in  many  situations,  serve  as  a  strong discincentive 
for  the  wife  to  join  the  Labour  market. 
As  stated  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  European  Community  has  already 
adopted  three  Directives  in  the. field of  equality for  men  and  women,  ld 
_ ence 
which  have  the  effect  amongst  other  things,of  promoting  women's  economic  indepen\ 
With  respect  to  the  subject  matter of  these  Directives,  direct  and 
indirect  discrimination  based  on  sex or marital  status  is outlawed, 
with  the  aim  of  ensuring that  women  and  men  receive  equal  pay  and 
equal  treatment  in  employment  and  social  security.  A situation where 
the  tax  treatment  of  wo~king women  differs,  in  practice,  from  that 
of  men,  runs  counter  the  progress  already  achieved  in  promoting  equality 
in  employment,  and  may  in  cases  where  a  woman  finds  her  tax  payments 
increasing  upon  marriage,  act  as  a  disincentive  in  her  decisions  relating 
to employment. 
It  is not  only  with  regard to  wage-earners  that  obstacles  can  arise to  the 
application  of  equal  treatment  in practice.  A particular problem  affecting a 
number  of  women  in  the  Community  is  that  of  tax  rules  which  have  a 
restrictive effect  on  remuneration  for  the  work  done  by  the  spouse  of  the 
head  of  a  business.  Wages  paid  to  a  spouse  are  generally deductible  from 
the  taxable  income  of  the  head  of  the  business  only  up  to  a  certain  ceiling, 
which  inevitably  limits  the  actual  amount  paid  to  that  ceiling. 
.1. Tho  CoMmlss~oG has  mnde  its position  clear  on  this  subject  in  its 
proposal  for  n  Council  Directive  on  equal treatment  for  men  and  women 
in  sclf-0mployed  occupations,  including  agricul~ure,  and  on  protection 
during  pregnancy  ~nd maternity  (1),  submitted  to  the  Council  on  15th  March  1984. 
Article  6  of  this  proposal  states  that•Membcr  States  shnll  take 
the  measure~ necessary  to  abolish  fiscal  prnvisions  an~ practices 
~~hich  constitute direct  or  indirect  discrir01inc:tion  in  that  they 
~rejudice  in  a  ~ub~t~ntivc way  the  status  of  the  spouse  as  employee.h 
III.  DESCRIPTION  OF  EXISTING  INCOME  TAX  SYSTEMS 
Income  tax  is  calculated  with  reference  to  a  ~a~ic structure  consisting 
first  of  all  of  the  tax  unit  or  taxable  person  concerned.  Once  that  unit 
has  been  idettl:ified,  the  ;)mount  of  income  which  will  be  taxed  must 
then  be  calculated,  by  reference  to  income  earned,  Less  allowances 
permitted  lJy  the  ~;yster.t  in  question.  Upon  that  taxable  income, 
u.'rtil~n  rat:e::  of  ~a;<  are  then  arplied,  produc~ng the  t.Jx  p<1yabte, 
an  ar.10unt  aqain:t  v!hich  under  some  systems  ti'!Y.  reductions  may  be  offset. 
1 L must  be  stressed that  this  Memorandum  is  concerned  ~1i th  income 
~~rneJ from  c1np~oyment,  and  not  with  the  t~xatinn of  unearned  income. 
It  ·is  al:~o  t'(.'levant  to fliHJtion  at  this  junctur1"  t11.1t  ·;ow~  ol  the  more  complex 
problem:;  concer·p·;ng  thE'  taxation  of  couples  aL··.n  c;onc,:~rn  the  risk  of  di~.cri-
minat·ion  be:tw('en  m;-Jr-r-;ed  and  unmarried  person:;  as  ~1ell  c:s  tht:  differences  in 
lreatm~':lt  of  thr~  fir~t  and  the  second  ei.lrner.  i·loreovcr,  it  must  also  be  l.Jorn 
in  nind  tltat  each  national  system  of  taxation  has  been  d~vcloped as  an  entity 
with  a  coherent  balance  between  units,  rates  and  ~Llowances;  a  change  in  any 
of  these  elements  m2y  require  other  adjustments  to maintain  a  balance  1n  the 
syster.:. 
A.  TAX  UNIT 
In  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Community  d~ffcrent  forms  of  the 
two  basic  types  of  tax  unit  can  be  found,  these  two  basic  types  being 
the  hGusehold  or  the  individual. 
Taking  rirst  the  systems  that  use  the  household  as  the  tnx  unit,  the 
rrtost  bDsic  form  of  this  is  <Jggregate  taxation  pure  and  simple. 
'.!nder  u~-i~-;  syslem  the  incomes  of  spouses  are  udded  together  to determine 
the  amount  of  taxable  income. 
. I. 
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After permitted deductions  have  been  made,  the  tax  rate(s)  is  applied 
to  the  total  remaining  income. 
If  we  then  look  at  this situation  from  the  point  of  view  of  two  people 
before  and  after marriage,  we  can  see  the  effect  of  aggregate  taxation 
when  combined  with  a  set  of  progressive  tax  rates. 
Example  1 
Pure  aggregation 
hypothetical  tax  rates 
As  single people 
A earns 
8  earns 
10,000  ECUS 
5,000  ECUS 
30%  on  first  5,000 
40%  between  5,000  and  10,000 
SO%  between  10,000  and  15,000 
A pays  30%  on  5,000 
40%  on  next  5,000 = 3,500  ECUS 
8  pays 
both  together pay  5,000  ECUS 
30%  on  5,000  = 1,500  ECUS 
As  married  couple 
husband  is  in  general  responsible  for  payment  on  their total  income 
of  15,000  ECUS 
couple  pay  30%  on  5,000 
40%  on  next  5,000 
SO%  on  next  5,000 
a  total  of 
= 1,500  ECUS 
=  2,000  ECUS 
= 2,500  ECUS 
6,000  ECUS 
In  other  words,  the  couple  may  consider  that  in practical  terms, 
upon  marriage, 8's earnings  of  5,000  ECUS  are  now  liable for  2,500  ECUS  in  tax 
rather  than  the  1,500  ECUS  paid  before. 
This  is of  course  a  simplistic  example,  taking  no  account  of  other  tax 
advantages  that  might  be  accorded  to  the  couple  in  the  way  of  allowances, 
tax  reductions,  etc;  It  can,  however,  be  said that  the  nature  of  the 
system  is  such  as  to discourage  the  lower  earner of  a  couple,  be  that 
the  wife  or  the  husband. 
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Recognition  of  this  problem  has  led  to  the  institution of  forms  of 
aggregate  taxation  which  take  into account  the  problems  of  applying 
progressive  tax  rates,  in  so  far  as  a  couple's  earnings  are  concerned, 
the  most  widespread  of  these  being  the splitting system. 
Under  this  system  the  earnings  of  the  spouses  are  added  together  then  divided 
in  two.  Even  where  only  one  spouse  has  an  earned  income,  this  will  still 
be  divided  in  two.  The  tax  is  then  multiplied  by  two  to  produce  the 
total  amount  of  tax  due.  The  splitting system  makes  an  attempt  to  take 
the different  contributive  capacity of  couples  into  account  and  to 
minimise  differences  between  one  and  two  earner  couples. 
Example  2  splitting system,  taking  the  same  hypothetical  tax  rates 
as  example  1 
A earns  10,000  ECUS 
8  earns  5,000  ECUS 
As  single people 
A pays  3,500  ECUS 
8  pays  1,500  ECUS 
As  married  couple 
Household  pays  tax  on  15,000  :  2  = 7,500  ECUS 
at  30%  on  5,000  =  1,500  ECUS 
at  40%  on  2,500  =  1,000  ECUS 
This  total  of  2,500  ECUS  is  then  multiplied  by  2  to  give  tax  due  of 
5,000  ECUS,  the  same  joint total  as  they  would  have  paid  as  single  people. 
The  most  important  effect,  however,  of  the  splitting system  is that 
income  is split  regardless  of  whether  one  or  both  spouses  are  contributing to  it. 
Supposing  therefore that  A,  our  higher  earner is also the  sole  earner 
for  the  couple,  we  can  see  a  difference  in  tax  payment  under  the  splitting 
system  by  simplevirtue of  being  married.  As  a  single  person  A would  have 
paid 3,500  ECUS  on  the  supposed  10,000  ECUS  income,  under  the  aggregate  system 
3,500  ECUS  also,  but  under  splitting only 3,000  ECUS  would  be  payable • 
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A variant  of  the  splitting system  is  found  in  the  system  of  family 
quotient,  whereby  the  aggregate  income  of  the  family,  spouses  and 
dependent  children,  is  divided  by  a  "family quotient"  rather than 
simply  by  two.  This  "quotient"  is  calculated  by  reference  to  the 
number  of  persons  comprising  the  family  unit,  increasing  by  a  certain 
proportion  according  to  the  number  of  dependants  within  the  unit. 
The  tax  is  calculated on  the  family  income  divided  by  the  quotient, 
then  the  amount  of  tax  obtained  is  multiplied  by  the  quotient  to  produce 
the  total  tax  due. 
Within  the  aggregate  system,  some  relief  may  also  be  given  by  the  use 
of  very  wide  tax  bands  or  double  tax  bands  which  Limit  the  progressive 
nature  of  the  rates  applied. 
The  second  form  of  tax  unit  employed  is  of  course  the  individual,  where 
each  person  is  taxed  on  his/her  own  income,  as  single people,  although 
allowances  etc.  may  differ  with  the  family  situation  of  the  individual 
concerned. This  is  known  as  separate  taxation. 
This  should  not  be  confused  with  systems  of~eparate assessmentr which 
come  within  the  aggregate  taxation  system. 
I/  I/  Under  separate  assessment 
total  tax  payable  does  not  change,  but  is  ~ttributed to  each 
spouse  according  to  income. 
INCOME  TAX  SYSTEMS  APPLIED  IN  THE  MEMBER  STATES  (1) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Aggregation  <variations  of  splitting and  separate  tav.ation) 
Separate  taxation 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United  Kingdom 
Splitting  (may  choose  separate taxation) 
Family  quotient  (variant  of  splitting) 
Separate taxation 
In  principle,  separate  taxation,  in practice,  aggregation  used 
Separate  taxation 
Aggregation  (plus  splitting or  family  quotient) 
Aggregation,  with  separate  assessment 
:  Aggregation  or  separate taxation 
.I. 
(1)  Information given  is  taken  from  the  study  on  income  tax  systems, 
completed  in  1982,  and  updated  where  information  has  been  available. 
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B.  TAX  RATES 
Equal  tax  treatment  of  men  and  women  can  be  assumed  to  imply  that 
the  fact  that  an  income  is  earned  by  a  man  or  by  a  woman  should 
not  affect  the  rate applied.  Under  a  system  of  separate  taxation 
this  would  necessarily be  the  case.  Under  the  aggregate  system 
in  its basic  form  this  can  only  be  the  case  if  a  single  tax  rate is 
applied.  In  the  European  Community,  however,  progressive  tax  rates 
are  the  norm.  Their  effect  is  minimised  by  a  variety of  systems; 
more  or  less effective,  depending  on  the  incomes  earned. 
These  systems  have  been  described  under  "A"  as  being  the  splitting 
system,  the  family  quotient  system,  and  systems  which  try to  ensure  that 
the  progression  of  rates  ascends  in  wide  bands  (United  Kingdom)  or  where 
tax  bands  are  doubled  for  couples  (Ireland). 
When  it  comes,  therefore,  to  systems  which  offer  a  choice  to  the  individual 
to  opt  for  a  system  of  separate taxation,  the  choice  is  affected first 
of  all  by  the different  rate  structure.  If separate taxation  means 
avoiding  progressive  rates  it will  be  the  favoured  option.  In  other  cases 
where  the  aggregate  system  provides  compensation  for  progressive  rate 
structures  by  splitting or other  methods,  the  financial  advantage  of 
opting  for  separate  taxation  will  depend  on  income. 
C.  TAX  ALLOWANCES  AND  REDUCTIONS  (1) 
There  are  a  bewildering variety of  methods  for  taking  a  tax-payer's 
family  and  personal 
of  tax  Liability. 
circumstances  into  account  in  the  calculation 
Such  allowances  and  reductions  are  mostly of  benefit  to the  spouse  who 
earns  the  higher  income,  although  not  invariably,  as  the  method  of 
calculation  (flat-rate or  percentage)  may  have  different  effects  according 
to the  levels  of  income  earned  by  each  spouse.  Some  Member  States 
have  prefcrr•:rJ,  in  the  case  of  allowances  granted  for  the  benefit  of 
children,  to  pay  an  allowance  directly to  the  person  who  is  responsible 
for  the  care  of  the  child,  thereby  avoiding  any  reference  to the 
(1)  Definition- allowances 
- reductions 
amounts  which  can  be  deducted  from 
taxable  income  before  tax; 
. I. 
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ordinarily taxable  income  of  either  spouse  (system  used  in  Denmark, 
F.R.  of  Germany,  Netherlands  and  United  Kingdom),  as  well  as,  in  some 
cases,  providing  for  an  allowance  against  tax. 
Tax  relief  in  general  seems  to  fall  into  certain  groups  where,  as  a 
matter  of  national  policy,  certain expenses  incurred  by  tax-payers  may 
be  deducted  either  from  their  income  before tax,  or  from  the  tax  to 
be  paid  upon  their  income. 
The  most  generally accepted  criteria for  personal  allowances  include 
-dependent children  (sometimes  a  separate  allowance  is  granted  to  the 
person  caring  for  the  child) 
- other  dependants,  often  on  stringent  conditions 
- on  marriage,  some  Member  States  grant  a  type  of  premium  upon  marriage 
-child care expenses,  in  some  Member  States 
- tax  relief  for  repayment  of  mortgages  or  insurance  premiums. 
Clearly the  right  to deduct  allowances  from  income  liable to  tax or 
deductions  from  taxes  payable directly affects  the  tax  due  from  each 
individual. 
It  is  interesting to  note  that  where  the  Member  State offers  a  choice 
between  an  aggregate  or  a  separate taxation  system,  it is  the difference 
in  allowances  as  well  as  the  rate structure available  under  each  system 
that  determines  the  choice.  For  instance  some  allowances  are still 
granted  only to  the  husband,  and  the  choice  of  separate taxation  can 
entail  a  loss  of  allowances. 
F.ven  in  those  States  where  a  tax  reduction  is  granted  specifically on 
the  earned  income  of  the  wife,  this  does  not  reflect  the  real  additional 
charges  on  her  income,  particularly as  less  than  half  the  Member  States 
allow the  declaration of  expenses  for  child-care  and  upkeep  of  the  home 
to  either  the  husband  or  the  wife.  The  ability to  deduct  the  necessarily 
increased expenditure  involved  in  caring  for  children  and  domestic  work 
in  a  household  where  both  spouses  work  outside  the  home,  would  help  to 
offset,  particularl~the impact  of  progressive  rate  structures  • 
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ALLOWANCES  AND  REDUCTIONS  (1) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
I  Dependants 
1 Tax  reductions  for 
1 dependent  children, 
I  spouse  (under  aggre-
j gation) 
! 
/child-care  expenses  1  on  marriage  ~Personal 
!
Tax  reduction  for!Flat-rate  basic 
husband  on  first  ,allowance  divided 
marriage,  first  !according to  income. 
I 
I 
child  lExtra  allowance  for 
I  i lower  earner  of 
!couple 
I 
I  /Flat-rate allowance, 
\doubled  if only  one 
'  '  I  ':  --------r----- ---------------- ---·-t·--
Germany  1 Allowance  for  depen- I 
) dent  chiLdren  under 
-t-
I  h  •  :spouse  as  1ncome 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
I certain  circumstan- I 
cies 
Allowance  for  wife 
even  if she  has  own 
1 Cost  of  nursery 
i  income. 
i deductible  if  wife 
i has  prof.  activity 
Allowance  for  depen-
dent  children. 
Also  reductions 
I 
I 
Dealt  with  in  fami-
ly  quotient  system  I 
Allowance  for  child 
care  etc.  where  both 
1  spouses  work 
i 
i 
Allowance  for  depen-
dent  children 
I 
! Reduction  for  spouse  , 
with  income  tess  than) 
) a  certain  amount.  i 
: Reduction  per  child, I 
i and  other depen- 1 
i  dants 
!  i 
Housekeeper  allo- Nuptial  allowance 
wance  for  heads  of  ~n first  year  of 
one-parent  families  ~arriage 
Luxembourg I  1 Flat-rate allowance 
! for  domestic  staff  I 
I 
Netherland~ 
I 
I 
i 
U.K.  Same  allowances 
·~ee  footnote  1,  page  8 
I or  child-care 
I 
i 
: Allowance  for  child-
1  care  expenses  <new 
taw) 
:At lowance  for  single 
parents  with  child/ 
children  living  at 
home 
Married  man's 
allowance 
I 
'Flat-rate personal 
;allowance 
! 
I
,Flat-rate deduction 
I 
for  each  wage-
earner 
I 
I 
I 
Flat-rate personal 
a l towance 
Flat-rat~ reduction 
l 
!Flat-rate allowance 
/ 
Flat-rate allowance 
Flat-rate personal 
at lowance 
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D.  TAX  HETURNS 
The  responsibility for  completing  and  returning  a  declaration  of 
taxes  varies  largely according  to  the  tax  system  employed,  in  tne 
sense  that  in  general  under  the  system  of  separate taxation,  each 
taxable  person files  his/her  own  tax  return,  although  in  Greece 
husband  and  wife  make  a  joint declaration,  which  the  wife  signs 
also  only if she  has  income  of  her  own.  In  Italy a  married  couple 
may  file  a  joint  return  if they  wish. 
Under  the  aggregation  systems  in  general  married  couples  file  a  joint 
return,  for  example  in  Germany  under  the  splitting system,  in  France, 
in  Ireland,  in  Luxembourg  and  in  the  United  Kingdom.  In  Belgium 
each  tax-payer  should file  a  return,  but  married  couples  use  the 
same  form.  Some  tax  systems  require  the  signature of  both  partners 
(Germany)  for  others  the  husband  must  sign  it  (United  Kingdom, 
Ireland).  In  France,  under  1983  legislation,  both  partners  must  now 
sign  the  return,  where  previously  the  wife  might  sign  if  she  earned 
her  own  income. 
Responsibility for  filing  a  tax  return- married  couples 
Husband  Wife 
must  file  (same  form>  Belgium  must  file 
--.::..---t------------------------ -- ------·------- -
Denmark  must  file  must  file  ------+------------------------ ---· 
Germany  splitting- must  sign  joint 
return  - separate taxation  -
files  own  return 
splitting - must  sign  joint  return  -
separate taxation- files  own  return 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
ItaLy 
files  joint  return,  husband 
must  sign 
must  sign  joint  return 
files  joint  return.  May  do 
so  even  if  wife  has  sole 
income 
must  file  return  (may  file 
joint  return,  signs  only  if  she 
has  income 
must  sign  joint  return 
may  file  return  if taxed  or 
assessed separately 
must  file  return  (may  file  jointly) 
jointly)  ! 
------+-----------------+------------------------------ ----
Luxembourg  "tax-payer" files  joint  retur~ 
N;;her  land~- ~eturn fiLed  if  ;~cei  ves  I  r-;t~~~--fi-Led if-re~ei  v~~--i-~c-~;~ ---
-.... _______ j- -~-~-c~-~~- ...... ------- ! 
U.K.  I  aggregation  - responsible 
for  filing  return. 
separate taxation  - may 
file  separate  return 
separate taxation- may  file 
separate  return 
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IV.  PROBLEMS  RELATING  TO  EQUAL  TREATMENT  WITH  REGARD  TO  EXISTING  SYSTEMS 
A r0ccnt  survey  (1)  was  undertaken  into discrimination  against  women 
at  work  in  the  10  Member  States. 
One  of  the  questions  put  was  as  follows 
-·  some  peop!.e  sdy  that  the  ~Jay  income  tax  works  in  your  country makes 
it, in  certain  families,  hardly  worthwhile  for  the  wife  to  work 
because  too  much  of  what  she  earns  is  taken  away  in  tax  from  her 
or  her  husband's  salary. 
It  was  ~nteresting  to  note  that  the  highest  percentages  of  women  who 
felt  the  tax  system  did  dissuade  married  wom2n  from  working  c~me from 
Ireland,  Luxembot1rg  and  Belgium,  where  aggregate  taxation  is  the  rule. 
The  lo\:est  percentages  cnme  from  Italy and  Greece,  ;;here  separate 
tax~tion is  applied. 
It  \Jould,  ;1t  a  th1c  when  the  number  of  married  ;;o1i1Cn  on  the  labour 
market  is  increasing,  be  difficult  to assess  the  precise  role  played 
by  systems  of  tnxation  in  married  women's  decisions  to  work  or  not. 
It CC3n,  ho\JCVf.:r,  be  said  thnt  when  analysinD  income  tax  systems  from  the 
point  o~  view  of  their  impact  upon  married  women,  ~  differcnc~ in 
treatment  can  be  found  under  many  systems. 
This  differer1cc  in  treatment  could  not  neccssQrily  be  described  as 
direct  discrimination,  as  often it is only  indirectly  th~t  the  tax 
system  in  fact  affects  m~rried women.  Taking  the  most  obvious  case  of 
aggregate taxation,  we  can  see  from  the  examples  shown  on  page  5, 
example  1,  that,  for  the  couple,  the  wages  of  the  lower  earner  will  be 
considered  to  be  the  secondary  income  and  w~ll  be  taken  as  being  taxed 
at  the  highest  rate applied.  In  the  catcgorj  of  Lower  earners,  we  will 
find  the  mnjority of  married  women,  who  do  indeed  often  perceive their 
Lreat~ent  as  being  discriminatory. 
.!. 
(1)  European  women  in  paid  employment  1984  CV/1240/84-FR) - 13  -
The  combination  of  reduction  in  the  income  accruing  from  the  woman's 
earnings  outside  the  home  and  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  value 
of  her  work  in  the  home  upon  marriage  and  the birth  of  children  may 
together  have  a  real  effect  on  her  view  of  the  economic  value  of 
employment,  while  the  married  man  in  general  would  consider  that 
he  receives  tax  benefits  upon  marriage  and  upon  the  birth  of  children. 
It  can  of  course  be  said that  the  reverse  of  this  situation is true 
when  the  husband  is  the  Lower  earner of  the  couple,  a  situation, 
as  mentioned  above,  which  arises  in  a  minority  of  cases.  We  are  not 
here  dealing  with  a  case  of  direct  discrimination,  but  one  where 
an  indirect  adverse  effect  is  created  by  the  use  of  a  system  which 
in  practice differentiates  in  its  treatment  of  women  and  men  when 
taken  as  a  couple  for  tax  purposes. 
-A.)-
One  can  assume  that  the  various  systems  of  income  taxation  in  the  Member 
States  are  not  the  result  of  an  intention to discriminate  against  women, 
but  of  historical  fact,  that  women  were  regarded  as  economically 
dependent  upon  their  husbands,  in  whose  name  property  was  held  and  income 
received.  This  traditional  concept  of  the  one  earner  family  with 
dependent  children  is,  however,  no  Longer  the  norm.  Taking  the 
situation,  for  example,  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  married  man  with  a 
non-working  wife  and  dependent  children  represented  in  1979  8%  of  the 
male  Labour  force  and  5%  of  the  total  Labour  force  (1).  Durinq  the  Last 
ten  years  a  number  of  Member  States  have,  as  a  consequence,  introduced  measures 
aimed  at  reducing  the effect  of  progressivity on  the  family  income. 
Where  the  effects  of  pure  aggregation  have  been  diminished  by  the  use 
of  a  splitting or  family  quotient  system,  some  comments  need  to  be  made 
on  these  systems  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  married  woman. 
Marriage  and  the  splitting system  operate  most  in  favour  of  high  income 
one-earner  families,  as  the  income  is split  regardless  of  the  number  of 
persons  contributing to  it, and  there  can  thus  be  a  strong  incentive 
in  these  families  to  keeping  the  woman  in  the  home,  on  the  basis  that 
the  marriage  is  ~lready contributing money  in  reduced  taxation  and  any 
income  the  wife  earns  will  again  start  being  taxed  at  the  highest 
rate  paid  by  the  husband  and  be  the  less  useful  for  the  household. 
(1 >Final  report  of  the  Study  Commission  "Families  in the  future",. 
January  1983 
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Taking  our  example  2  on  page  6,  we  have  seen  that  the  couple  pays 
5,000  ECUS  in  tax  whether  single or  married.  Assuming  then,  that 
our  higher  earner  A is  the  husband.  He  will  see  a  lessening  in 
taxation  on  his  income  by  virtue  of  marriage,  as  his 
tax  will  be  reduced  from  3,500  ECUS  to  3,000.  Inevitably the  couple 
uill  in  this  case  view  B's  tax  as  representing  the  2,000  ECUS  remaining 
in  the  total  of  5,000  ECUS  payable  on  their  joint  earnings. 
Couples  may  be  concerned  with  their  total  tax  burden.  In  many  cases 
their total  taxation  is  not  necessarily  higher -and may  indeed  be  Lower-
than  under  the  system  of  independent  taxation,  depending  on  the  progressivity 
of  the  system.  But,  that  said,  in  order  to  achieve  equal  treatment  of 
men  and  women  a  system  of 
independent  taxation  has  obvious  advantages.  It  avoids  any  aggregation 
of  income,  (in  some  cases  of  course  this  may  be  financially 
disadvantageous  compared  to  a  splitting system)  and  therefore  can 
avoid  a  difference  in  tax  rates  applied.  In  systems  where  it is 
public  policy to  assist  families  by  the  use  of  favourable  tax  systems, 
there  is  no  reason  why  allowances  and  deductions  of this  kind  cannot 
be  part  of  a  system  of  independent  taxation. 
Indeed,  the  continuing  increase  in  the  number  of  married  women  entering 
the  job  market,  and  the  consequent  rise  in  the  number  of  two  earner 
families,  coupled  with  the  continued  application of  tax  systems  which 
benefit  the  traditional  family,  produces  the  anomalous  situation 
in  some  Member  States  that  a  growing  number  of  couples  will  be 
financially better off  remaining  unmarried,  and  this particularly 
where  there  are  children,  owing  to  benefits  granted  for  one  parent  families. 
It  must  be  added  that,  whatever  the  tax  unit  bmployed,  the  allowances  and 
reductions  within  the  system  will  affect,  particularly,  choices  to  be 
made  in  countries  where  tax  payers  have  the possibility of  opting  for 
a  sys:_em  ·Jf  separate  taxation.  In  prilctice it  appears  that  few 
tax-payers  nt  for  systems  of  separate  taxation  as  opposed  to  some 
form  of  aggregation,  where  the  systems  permit  a  choice. 
An  examination  of  the  options  will  show  that  it  is  often  the  allowances 
or  reductions  available  under  the  different  systems  that  influence 
choice,  as  often  separate  taxation  can  involve  a  loss  of  allo11ances • 
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Some  allowanc~ remain,  granted  only to the  husband  under  the 
aggregation  system,  (as  for  example  marriage  allowances  in  Belgium 
and  Ireland  and  the  married man's  allowance  in  the  United  Kingdom). 
While  it is difficult  to assess  the  precise effect  the  taxation  systems 
may  have  upon  an  individual  married  woman's  decision  to  work  or  not  to 
work,  the  analysis  conducted  by  the  Commission  clearly demonstrates 
a  very different  picture  in  terms  of  tax  payments  by  a  married  woman 
according to the  tax  system  employed. 
Comparing  the  tax  paid  by  a  married  woman  as  against  a  single  woman, 
leaving aside  other  possible  advantages  granted  to  the  couple  as  a 
whole,  the  results  of  the  analysis  are  clear.  From  the  individual  point  of  view, 
under  separate  taxation 
she  pays  the  same  tax,  under  aggregate  taxation  she  pays  more. 
The  splitting system  has  an  effect  that  is  less  clear,  but  in  general 
if  the  married  woman  is earning  the  same  amount  as  her  husband  she  will 
pay  the  same  tax  as  a  single  person.  If  however  she  is earning  less 
(which  will  generally be  the  r.ase)  the  couple  will  pay  Less  tax  than 
an  unmarried  couple  uould  have  paid,  but  ~Jithin the  couple,  assuming  that 
the  wife's  income  is  regarded  as  a  secondary  income,  she  will  be 
paying  more  than  a  single  person  and  her  husband  less. 
Within  the  couple  one  can  then  compare  the  situation of  a  married  woman 
against  a  married  man.  Under  separate  taxation  the  tax  paid  should 
essentially be  the  same,  although  under  certain circumstances  the 
married  woman  may  pay  Less  tax  (in  Belgium,  as  personal  and  real 
property will  be  added  as  husband's  income  and  taxed  in  his  name) 
or  more  tax  (in  the  Netherlands,  as  the  husband  benefits  from  more 
exemptions). 
Under  the  aggregation  system  the  income  of  the  Lower  earner,  most  often 
the  wife,  will  in  practice be  taxed  more  highly  as  the  inr.omc,  which 
is treated  as  a  secondary  income,  will  start  paying  tax  at  the  highest 
rate  paid  by  the first  income. 
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It  is  worth  noting that  more  than  one  Member  State  has  put  the  tax 
unit  under  study  recently and  that  the  results  have  been  varied 
(in  France,  recommendations  in  favour  of  an  option  for  separate 
taxation  (1),  in  the  Netherlands  an  amendment  of  the  tax  system 
which  extends  equality of  treatment  for  married  women,  and  at  the 
same  time  assesses  individuals  separately under  a  "household"  umbrella 
whatever  the  composition  of  the  household.  In  the  Federal  Republic 
of Germany  an  assessment  of  the splitting system  was  undertaken 
and  some  amendments  are  envisaged  particularly with  reference  to 
family  allowances.  In  the  United  Kingdom  a  series of  bodies  have 
also  recommended  the  abolition of  the  married  man's  allowance. 
V.  PRINCIPAL  AREAS  FOR  CORRECTIVE  ACTION 
The  New  Community  Action  Programme  for  the  Promotion  of  Equal  Opportunities 
for  Women,  the  opinion  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Equal  Opportunities 
and  the  1984  Resolution  of  the  European  Parliament  on  the  situation 
of  women  in  Europe  have  asked  the  Commission  to examine  the  current 
situation  with  respect  to the  impact  of  income  tax  systems  on  women's 
work  and  to  proceed  to  recommend  a  system  with  a  "neutral  effect"  on 
women's  work. 
It  is clear  from  the  foregoing  chapters  that  the  system  with  the  most  neutral 
effect  from  the  point  of  view  of  equal  treatment  of  men  and  women  workers 
is  that  of  separate  taxation  in  that  the  fact  of  being  a  married  woman  does 
not  of  itself alter the  tax  paid  by  an  individual.  The  effects  of  progressivity 
on  the  tax  systems  may  nevertheless  be  alleviated  under  the  splitting or 
family  quotient  system.  Under  existing  systems  of  separate  taxation  a 
married  woman  may  of  course  pay  more  or  Less  tax  than  her  husband  owing  to 
the distribution of  allowances  within  the  couple,  but  she  will  pay  the 
same  tax  as  a  single  woman. 
Equality is  seen  to  be  best  served  when  personal  allowances  and  tax  reductions 
may  be  equally divided  between  the  husband  and  wife.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  the  types  of  allowances  and  reductions  remain  roughly 
similar  under  the  different  taxation  systems. 
. I. 
(1)  cf.  in particular Social  and  Economic  Committee  report - 17  -
The  principle areas  within  which  the  impact  of  the  present  income 
tax  systems  would  appear  to  have  an  adverse  effect  upon  married 
women's  tax  burdens,  are  the  following  : 
- the  system  of  pure  aggregate  taxation  in  general 
- systems  of  allowances  or  tax  reductions  granted  a  priori  to  the 
husband 
- the  lack  of  an  allowance  or  deduction  for  the  costs  incurred  in 
child-care  and  domestic  help  when  a  married  couple  both  work 
outside  the  home 
-the inability to  declare  own  income  for  tax 
-the responsibility for  the  non-payment  of  tax  by  the  other  spouse 
- Limitations  on  the  amount  of  income  that  can  be  paid  to  an 
"assisting wife"  by  a  husband,  either by  the  i111posing  income 
Limits  or ceilings  for  tax  exemptions. 
A system  of  totally  independent  taxation  is  to  be  recommended  from  the 
point  of  view  of  achieving  equal  treatment  and  thus  at  Least  an  option 
of  separate  taxation  should  be  available  to  couples.  Since  many  Member 
States  have  recently put  income  taxation on  their  internal  agendas  at 
least  for  debate,  it  would  seem  a  suitable  moment  for  the  Commission  to 
remind  the  Member  States  of  the  Community's  commitments  to  equal  treatment. 
Action  6  of  the  New  Community  Action  Programme  on  the  Promotion  of 
Equal  Opportunities  for  Women  states  as  its aim  the  need  to  revise 
income  tax  systems  which  have  an  indirect  adverse  effect  on  women's 
employment.  The  analysis  conducted  by  the  Commission  in  accordance 
with  the  Action  Programme,  concluded  that  neutrality towards  working 
married  women  was  best  achieved  under  systems  of  separate  taxation, 
a  conclusion  demonstrated  clearly in  graphs  and  tables  (1). 
(1)  see  study on  "Implementation  of  equal  treatment  by  rev1s1ng 
income  tax  systems  which  appear  to  have  an  indirect  adverse 
effect  on  women's  employment,  their  right  to  work  and  their 
promotion  in  employment",  V/2798/1/82 
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The  Commission  has  therefore,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Action 
Programme,  a  commitment  to take  appropriate  measures.  As  a  first  step, 
this Memorandum  should  serve  to  raise  these  issues  for  discussion  at 
Community  level,  and  encourage  debate  on  an  issue  of  particular 
importance  for  women  and  for  the  family  as  a  whole. 
It  is  therefore  appropriate  that  this  commitment  be  followed  up  by 
a  debate at  Community  level  on  the  impact  of  income  taxation  systems 
on  equal  treatment  of  men  and  women  in  the  labour  market.  Such  a 
debate  which  could  draw  on  the  experience  of differing  taxation 
systems  within  Member  States  should  serve  to  clarify  the  issues 
involved  with  a  view  to stimulating a  more  detailed  review  within 
the  Member  States  of  current  provisions. 